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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Aristeo Gomez appeals from his judgment of conviction for lewd conduct with a 
minor under the age of sixteen. Mr. Gomez was found guilty following a jury trial and 
the district court imposed a unified sentence of twenty years, with ten years fixed. 
Mr. Gomez now appeals, and he asserts that the district court erred by admitting 
evidence of prior acts of sexual abuse pursuant to Idaho Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 
403. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 2006, Mr. Gomez was charged with one count of lewd conduct with a minor 
under the age of sixteen. (R., p.34.) Specifically, the Information alleged that 
Mr. Gomez "commit[ted] a lewd and lascivious act upon the body of a minor with the 
initials V.B., under the age of sixteen years, to-wit: of the age of fifteen (15) years, by 
touching and rubbing her breasts and vagina and offering her money to sleep with him, 
which incident occurred at 1843 Normal Avenue, Burley, Cassia County, Idaho, with the 
intent to gratify the sexual desire of the defendant." (R., p.34.) The State filed a notice 
of intent to introduce 404(b) evidence, and the district court held a hearing on this 
motion. (Augmentation.) 
At the hearing, counsel for Mr. Gomez informed the court, ''we have been made 
aware that there's several individuals who are going to testify about uncharged conduct 
involving Mr. Gomez." (10/6/06 Tr., p.24, Ls.15-18.) The court discussed its history of 
dealing with I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, stating: 
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Mr. Jensen [counsel for Mr. Gomez], when I was practicing law, I 
represented an individual by the name of Tom Phillips, and let me quote 
from the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Phillips found at 123 
Idaho 178: 
On February 14,1991, Phillips filed a motion to prevent the State, quote, 
from mentioning, referring to, or otherwise suggesting Thomas G. Phillips 
had been accused of other sexual behavior, end of quote. The motion 
was based on I.R.E. 403 and 404(b). The court heard argument on the 
motion, and it issued an order partially granting Phillips' motion. In its 
order, the district court ruled that before the State could mention other 
accusations of sexual misbehavior, it must make an offer of proof outside 
the presence of the jury. 
I took that case to trial for Mr. Phillips. I was his trial counsel. Let me 
continue quoting from the Supreme Court case: 'During the trial, the court 
allowed three women to testify regarding Phillips' sexual acts with them 
when they were minors.' 
And the jury found Mr. Phillips guilty, and I appealed. And this was one of 
the issues on appeal, did the district court correctly apply rules of evidence 
when it allowed the three women who were not victims in this case to 
testify regarding their accusations of Phillips' sexual misbehavior with 
them when they were minors. 
Now, these cases were years old at the time of this trial. The Supreme 
Court in the case of State versus Phillips - and I don't think it's ever been 
overruled - simply says:'After considering this testimony with the 
testimony of the minor victim and that of the defendant, we recognized 
that the jury was better able to compare patterns and methods, details and 
generalities, consistencies and discrepencies, and thereby made a ... 
meaningful and accurate assessment of the parties' credibility,' citing the 
case of State versus Tolman. 
(10/6/06 Tr., p.29, L.5 - p.30, L.14.) The district court later continued, citing again from 
Phillips, 
testimony of prior sexual misconduct is admissible where the party's 
credibility is at issue. The testimony by the three women, when 
considered with the victim's testimony, demonstrated Phillips' plan to 
exploit and sexually abuse an identifiable group of young female victims; 
the identifiable group being minor females who were relatives or friends of 
Phillips' daughters and visited Phillips' home. 
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(10/6/06 Tr., p.30, L.23 - p.31, L.5.) The district court informed the parties that it was 
going to permit the State to introduce its proposed evidence, 
with some limitations. I will prohibit the State from mentioning any prior 
victim of any prior sexual misconduct unless they first proffer proof to the 
court so I can evaluate it, as Judge Meehl did in this case that was 
affirmed on appeal. 
I understand, very clearly, Mr. Jensen, your argument. I have made it 
myself. I made to the Supreme Court myself. But I also understand their 
decision, and I'm going to adhere to what they did in that case in this case. 
It may be that the State's proffered testimony doesn't convince me that 
there's enough similarity that this becomes a credibility and a jury 
question. I may prohibit it. And I am going to prohibit [it], until I get the 
proffered proof, the State from mentioning it to the jury in their opening 
statement. 
(10/6/06 Tr., p.31, L.14 - p.32, L.5.) Counsel for the State asked if the court could set a 
hearing on the offer of proof for the following week. (10/6/06 Tr., p.32, Ls.19-25.) The 
court set a hearing. (10/6/06 Tr., p:33, Ls.20-25.) The court then again informed the 
parties that it was basing its ruling on the opinion in Phillips, and then stated: 
Counsel, they teach us in the evidentiary classes that they give new 
judges that there are no rules in sex abuse cases. I don't believe that, but 
I recognize that it seems like lawyers that make your arguments are 
losing, Mr. Jensen, at this point in time. And I have been there. 
It's a tough area of the law. It's just a tough area. I was -
Mr. Jensen, you argued with fervor; but I can assure you, so did I. I put 
my heart into this argument. I thought it was grossly unfair in the Phillips 
trial that they could bring in witnesses that were molested years before, 
who made no criminal complaints. I just thought that was an outrage, but 
the Supreme Court shot me down; and I'm under a duty to follow the law. 
(10/6/06 Tr., p.35, Ls.2-22.) (emphasis added.) Despite the fact that the court set 
a hearing on the offer of proof, and conditioned the admission of the evidence on the 
offer of proof, the court either did not have such a hearing, or if it did, it held it off the 
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record. Counsel has contacted the district court and learned pretrial hearings 
conducted in chambers are done without a court reporter and therefore it is impossible 
to name a court reporter or an estimated number of pages. (See motion to augment 
and suspend, filed 12/9/09.) It appears that there are three possibilities as to when the 
parties discussed the offer of proof: October 11, 2006, December 1, 2006, or May 11, 
2007. These were done in chambers, and therefore, without a court reporter. 
According to the hearing held on October 6, 2006, the parties agreed to conduct the 
offer of proof on October 11, 2006. (10/6/06 Tr., p.33, Ls.3-25.) However, there is no 
indication that a hearing actually occurred that day as there are no court minutes in the 
record from that date. (R., p.15.) Rather, the only entry in the ROA for that date is that 
the pretrial conference was continued to December 1,2006. (R., p.15.) 
On October 12, 2006, an amended order re: notice of trial setting and jury 
instructions. (R., p.96.) Assuming the offer of proof was continued to December 1, 
2006, the record indicates that a pretrial conference was held in chambers. (R., p.100.) 
The minutes only state that the "Court and Counsel discussed the case, and upon 
motion by the defendant, the Court continued the trial." (R., p.i00.) There is no 
indication whether the offer of proof occurred. 
The next possible hearing date is May 1, 2007. (R., p.106.) Again, this pretrial 
conference was held in chambers. (R., p.106.) The minutes only state that the "Court 
and Counsel discussed this case and the Court was advised it would go to trial as 
scheduled." (R., p.106.) There is no indication in the trial transcript that an offer of 
proof happened on the first day of trial. 
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Counsel attempted to augment the record with any possible transcripts after 
learning from the district court that court reporters were not present such hearings, but 
that motion was denied. (See motion to augment and suspend, filed 12/9/09; order 
denying motion, filed 12/30109.) Therefore, no record of an offer of proof was preserved 
for appellate review. 
The case proceeded to trial, where the State mentioned the 404(b) evidence in 
its opening statement: "You heard Judge Carlson read a long list of witnesses. I will 
call all of [V.B.'s] full sisters to the witness stand, and they will tell you about things that 
they observed or things that happened to them, things that they know about this case." 
(Tr., p.40, Ls.19-25.) 
The alleged victim in this case, V.B, was the first witness. She testified that 
Mr. Gomez was her stepfather. (Tr., p.48, Ls.22-24.) She testified that, in 2004, while 
her mother was out of town, she woke up to find Mr. Gomez sitting next to her in her 
bed. (Tr., p.65, Ls.3-10.) She stated that Mr. Gomez touched her breasts and vagina 
over her clothing. (Tr., p.65, L.16 - p.66, L.8.) V.B.'s brother was also in the bed during 
this time, and, surprisingly, did not wake up at all, even when V.B. told Mr. Gomez to 
stop. (Tr., p.66, Ls.9-16.) According to V.B., Mr. Gomez told her he would give her 
$100 if she would sleep with him. (Tr., p.66, Ls.18-19.) After she told him to get out of 
the room, he gave her money for her and her brother and left. (Tr., p.67, Ls.17-23.) 
V.B. did not tell anyone about what allegedly happened, nor did she wake up her 
brother. (Tr., p.70, Ls.12-20.) However, she eventually told her boyfriend about what 
she says happened. (Tr., p.72, Ls.9-11.) 
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Following V.B.'s testimony, a parade of witnesses testified about uncharged 
conduct. V.B.'s sister, E.B.T., testified next. (Tr., p.129, Ls.4-6.) She testified that 
when she was twelve, Mr. Gomez "grabbed me and hugged me really tight, and told me 
that he wanted to be with me." (Tr., p.135, Ls.13-15.) She understood that to mean 
that "he wanted to sleep with me." (Tr., p.135, Ls.22-24.) She stated that Mr. Gomez 
would get into bed with her while she was sleeping and touch her breasts. (Tr., p.138, 
Ls.2-13.) He apparently would do this even though her mother was in the same room in 
another bed. (Tr., p.139, Ls.13-18.) She testified that such behavior occurred until she 
was eighteen. (Tr., p.137, Ls.4-5.) She also testified that these types of incidents 
happened with her sister, S.B. (Tr., p.232, Ls.13-18.) However, she never told any of 
her sisters to avoid Mr. Gomez. (Tr., p.248, Ls.2-11.) 
Another sister, MAR.B., testified next. (Tr., p.252, Ls.2-6.) She stated that 
Mr. Gomez "grabbed me by my breasts, and he was behind me grabbing me, and I was 
scratching him and kicking him." (Tr., p.260, Ls.18-23.) She also testified that at times, 
she would wake up to find Mr. Gomez touching her. (Tr., p.266, Ls.4-10.) Like her 
previous sisters, she also testified that Mr. Gomez would walk in on her while she was 
taking a shower. (Tr., p.263, Ls.1-6.) She also testified that she observed Mr. Gomez 
touching E.B.T.'s breasts. (Tr., p.272, Ls.8-23.) 
Another sister, S.B.T., then testified. (Tr., p.296, Ls.9-16.) She testified that on 
one occasion, in the kitchen, "when I was passing, he had like moved his hand towards 
me and just touch - grabbed me touched me" on her vagina. (Tr., p.300, L.21 - p.301, 
L.7.) She also testified that she would wake up to find Mr. Gomez in bed with her 
touching her. (Tr., p.304, Ls.5-16.) She said that he would offer her money to sleep 
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with her. (Tr., p.304, Ls.17-25.) She also stated that his penis would touch her vagina 
but did not go inside. (Tr., p.306, Ls.1-15.) 
Another sister, M.B, also testified. (Tr., p.337, Ls.2-7.) She testified that on one 
occasion, while watching television, Mr. Gomez grabbed her breasts. (Tr., p.342, LS.9-
13.) She said he tried to touch her between her legs but did not. (Tr., p.343, Ls.8-11.) 
Mr. Gomez also allegedly offered her money to sleep with him. (Tr., p.346, Ls.16-25.) 
She also testified that at times she would wake up to find Mr. Gomez touching her 
between her legs and on her breasts. (Tr., p.352, Ls.1-17.) 
V.B.'s friend, C.G., testified next. (Tr., p.373, Ls.11-17.) She testified that one 
night, while spending the night at V.B.'s residence, she woke up to find Mr. Gomez 
touching her vagina; when he saw that he was awake, he said, "oy" and ran away. 
(Tr., p.379, L.22 - p.380, L.5.) C.G. testified that she told V.B. what happened, but V.B. 
told her she was only dreaming and to go back to sleep. (Tr., p.382, Ls.4-9.) 
The childrens' mother, and Mr. Gomez's wife, Francesca Barajas, then testified. 
(Tr., p.406, Ls.21-25.) She testified that her daughters told her about Mr. Gomez's 
alleged behavior, and that she did not believe them then and did not believe them at 
trial. (Tr., p.429, Ls.11-23.) She believed that her son-in-law, E.B.T.'s husband, was 
behind the allegations. (Tr., p.478, Ls.4-7.) 
Mr. Gomez was found guilty, and the district court imposed a unified sentence of 
twenty years, with ten years fixed. (R., p.224.) Mr. Gomez appealed. (R., p.229.) He 
asserts that the district court erred by permitting the State to introduce evidence of 
uncharged conduct. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err by admitting highly prejudicial Rule 404(b) evidence that was 
not relevant to any issue other than propensity? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred Its By Admitting Highly Prejudicial Rule 404(b) Evidence That 
Was Not Relevant To Any Issue Other Than Propensity 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Gomez asserts that the district court erred by admitting impermissible Rule 
404(b) evidence in the form of the testimony of E.B.T., S.B.T., MAR.B, M.B., and C.G. 
He asserts that this evidence was not relevant to a material and disputed issue other 
than propensity. However, even if relevant, he asserts that the probative value of that 
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
B. Standard Of Review 
This Court reviews a trial court's decision to admit evidence for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, _, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009) (citing State v. 
Field, 144 Idaho 559,564, 165 P.3d 273, 278 (2007) (citing State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 
110, 112, 106 P.3d 436, 438 (2005)). This Court must examine whether: (1) the trial 
court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the trial court acted within the 
outer bounds of its discretion and with applicable legal standards; and (3) the trial court 
reached its decision through an exercise of reason. Id. (citing Sun Valley Shopping Gtr., 
Inc. v. Idaho Power Go., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991) (citing State v. 
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)). However, determinations of 
relevancy are reviewed de novo. State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, _, 207 P.3d 186, 
194 (Ct. App. 2009). 
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C. The District Court Erred By Admitting Highly Prejudicial Rule 404(b) Evidence 
That Was Not Relevant To Any Issue Other Than Propensity 
It is a fundamental tenet of the American legal system that a defendant may 
only be convicted based upon proof that he committed the crime with which he is 
charged and not based upon poor character. State v. Wood, 126 Idaho 241,244,880 
P.2d 771, 774 (Ct. App. 1994). Evidence of misconduct not charged in an underlying 
offense may have an unjust influence on the jurors and may lead them to determine 
guilt based upon either: (1) a presumption that if the defendant did it before, he must 
have done it this time; or (2) an opinion that it does not really matter whether the 
defendant committed the charged crime because he deserves to be punished anyhow 
for other bad acts. Id. at 244-45, 880 P.2d at 774-75. "The prejudicial effect of 
[character evidence] is that it induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to 
have committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character." Grist, 
147 Idaho at _, 205 P.3d at 1188 (quoting State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510, 584 
P.2d 1231, 1235 (1978». Therefore, I.R.E. 404 precludes the use of character 
evidence or other misconduct evidence to imply that the defendant must have acted 
consistently with those past acts or traits. Id. 
I. R. E. 404 provides in pertinent part: 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, 
provided that the prosecution in a criminal case shall file and serve notice 
reasonably in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial 
notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it 
intends to introduce at trial. 
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I.R.E. 404. "Admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts when offered for 
a permitted purpose is subject to a two-tiered analysis." Grist, 147 Idaho at _, 205 
P.3d at 1188. "First, the trial court must determine whether there is sufficient evidence 
to establish the other crime or wrong as fact." 'd. (citations omitted.) "The trial court 
must then determine whether the other crime or wrong is relevant to a material and 
disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity." 'd. (citations 
omitted.) This evidence is only relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act 
occurred and that the defendant was the actor. 'd. (citation omitted.) 
While evidence of prior bad acts may be admitted to corroborate a victim's 
testimony or as evidence of a common scheme or plan, "trial courts must carefully 
scrutinize evidence offered as 'corroboration' or as demonstrating a 'common scheme 
or plan' in order to avoid the erroneous introduction of evidence that is merely probative 
of the defendant's propensity to engage in criminal behavior." Grist, 147 Idaho at _, 
205 P.3d at 1189. While prior bad acts evidence may be offered to corroborate a 
victim's testimony, "evidence offered for the purpose of 'corroboration' must actually 
serve that purpose; the courts of this state must not permit the introduction of 
impermissible propensity evidence merely by relabeling it as 'corroborative' or as 
evidence of a 'common scheme or plan.'" Grist, 147 Idaho at_, 205 P .3d at 1189-90. 
"Evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to i.R.E. 
404(b) when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate 
the defendant's propensity to engage in such behavior." 'd. In order to demonstrate 
that the proposed evidence demonstrates a "common scheme or plan," the State must 
demonstrate such a plan "embrac[es] the commission of two or more crimes so related 
11 
to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other .... " Grist, 147 Idaho at_, 
205 P.3d at 1190-91 (citations omitted.) 
Building on the holding in Grist, the Idaho Supreme Court recently held that, in 
order to demonstrate a common scheme or plan, 
at a minimum, there must be evidence of a common scheme or plan 
beyond the bare fact that sexual misconduct has occurred with children in 
the past. The events must be linked by common characteristics that go 
beyond merely showing a criminal propensity and instead must objectively 
tend to establish that the same person committed all the acts. 
State v. Johnson, Idaho P.3d 2010 WL 337993 at *3 (February 1, 2010) (not yet final). 
In Johnson, the district court identified the following characteristics that linked the 
current charged conduct to the prior bad acts to which the alleged victim testified: (1) 
both victims were about seven to eight years old; (2) both victims viewed Johnson as an 
authority figure because he was an older brother or father; (3) both courses of conduct 
involved Johnson requesting the victim to touch his penis. Id. at *4. The Supreme 
Court concluded: 
Id. 
These similarities, however, are sadly far too unremarkable to 
demonstrate a common scheme or plan in Johnson's behavior. The facts 
that the two victims in this case are juvenile females and that Johnson is a 
family member are precisely what make these incidents unfortunately 
quite ordinary. The prior acts are irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. 
In light of Grist and Johnson, Mr. Gomez asserts that the district court erred in 
determining that V.B.'s sisters' and friend's testimony was relevant for an issue other 
than propensity. 
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1. Offer Of Proof 
Regarding the first step of the analysis, determining whether a jury could 
reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor, 
Mr. Gomez asserts that the district court never made this finding, or, at least, never 
made it on the record. The district court specifically conditioned its order permitting the 
State to use the evidence on the State submitting an offer of proof. Grist requires, [f]irst, 
the trial court must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other 
crime or wrong as fact." Grist, 147 Idaho at _,205 P.3d at 1188. "The trial court must 
then determine whether the other crime or wrong is relevant to a material and disputed 
issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity." Id. (citations omitted.) This 
evidence is only relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and 
that the defendant was the actor. Id. (citation omitted.) 
The court scheduled a hearing, but the offer of proof, if it occurred, is not, and 
cannot be made, part of the record on appeal. The district court, therefore, never made 
the first required finding in a way that this Court can review. The district court 
recognized that it first needed an offer of proof from the State before it could rule on the 
evidence. Despite this, it was either never held, or held off the record. 
Mr. Gomez acknowledges that the State did, in its notice of intent to introduce the 
( 
404(b) evidence, supply written statements from the individuals it called at trial. 
(Augmentation.) However, these statements were filed before the hearing on the 
admissibility of the 404(b) evidence. As such, they were before the district court at the 
time of the hearing, and were apparently either not considered by the district court (it 
never mentioned the statements at the hearing), or considered to be insufficient 
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because the court still required the State to submit a further offer of proof. In any event, 
the district court never made any factual finding that the events occurred and that 
Mr. Gomez was actor, and by requiring an additional offer of proof, impliedly determined 
that the written offer of proof was insufficient. Because the district court did not make 
this first required finding, at least not on the record, the district court erred. 
2. Relevance For A Non-Propensity Purpose 
Second, the district court erred by applying the wrong standard. Admittedly, this 
is understandable, as the district court did not have the benefit of Grist and Johnson at 
the time of trial in this case. In deciding that the evidence could come in assuming an 
offer of proof was provided, the district court relied on State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 
845 P.2d 1211 (1993), for the proposition that such evidence constitutes a "plan to 
exploit and sexually abuse an identifiable group of young female victims." (10/6/06 
Tr., p.31, Ls.1-3.) To the extent this was the law at the time of trial in this case, it no 
longer is following Grist and Johnson, and Phillips has been implicitly overruled by the 
Idaho Supreme Court. 
Phillips relied exclusively on State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 819 P.2d 1143 
(1991), and State v. To/man, 121 Idaho 899,828 P.2d 1304 (1992), in its analysis. The 
testimony at issue revealed that, "when they were minors, they were friends of Phillips' 
daughters, that Phillips invited them into his garage to view pornographic materials, and 
that Phillips touched them in inappropriate areas." Phillips, 123 Idaho at 180, 845 P.2d 
at 1213. The Idaho Supreme Court held that, despite the fact that the alleged events 
took place sixteen years prior, 
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the testimony by the three women, when considered along with the 
victim's testimony, demonstrated Phillips' "general plan to exploit and 
sexually abuse an identifiable group of young female victims," Moore, 120 
Idaho at 745, 819 P.2d at 1145, the identifiable group being minor females 
who were relatives or friends of Phillips' daughters and visited Phillips' 
home. 
Id., 123 Idaho at 181,845 P.2d at 1214. Justice Bistline took issue with the majority's 
holding that the prior sexual misconduct evidence was part of a common scheme or 
plan: 
This caseL] following in the tradition of State v. Moore, and State v. 
Tolman, is yet another example of the Court putting its judicial stamp 
of approval on the all too common practice of putting a defendant on 
trial for uncharged crimes. This practice is nothing more than an 
obvious attempt to persuade the jury that "if he did it once, he did it 
this time too." That is exactly the kind of argument that I.R.E. 404(b) is 
supposed to prevent, and I dissent from this Court's continuing 
emasculation of the rule. 
In this case, the alleged common scheme or plan started sixteen years 
before the charged events. To say events separated by such a long 
period of time constitute anything except evidence tending to show a 
general propensity to commit sex offenses simply strains credibility. 
While Moore may at one time have been palatable, its immediate demise 
would better serve the administration of justice in the Idaho system of 
criminal law. 
Philips, 123 Idaho at 182-83, 845 P.2d at 1215-16 (Bistline, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted) (italics in original) (bold text added). 
In Grist, the defendant specifically argued that Moore and Tolman were 
wrongfully decided and should be overruled. Grist, 147 Idaho at _,205 P.3d at 1187. 
And although the Idaho Supreme Court did not overrule Moore "completely," it did 
acknowledge that, 
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our explanation in Moore could have just as easily been stated as follows: 
"If the defendant has committed another sex offense, it is more probable 
that he committed the offense for which he is charged, thus reducing the 
probability that the prosecuting witness is lying, while at the same time 
increasing the probability that the defendant committed the crime." The 
unstated premise in Moore is simply this: "If he did it before, he probably 
did it this time as well." This complete reliance upon propensity is not a 
permissible basis for the admission of evidence of uncharged misconduct. 
Grist, 147 Idaho at _,205 P.3d at 1190. Phillips relies on this "unstated premise" as 
well. The standard applied by the district court in this case, that the evidence 
demonstrated a "plan to exploit and sexually abuse an identifiable group of young 
female victims" may have been supported by Phillips, but Phillips is no longer good law. 
Johnson makes this clear: 
at a minimum, there must be evidence of a common scheme or plan 
beyond the bare fact that sexual misconduct has occurred with children in 
the past. The events must be linked by common characteristics that go 
beyond merely showing a criminal propensity and instead must objectively 
tend to establish that the same person committed all the acts. 
Johnson, at *3. Further, 
[the] similarities [in Johnson], however, are sadly far too unremarkable to 
demonstrate a common scheme or plan in Johnson's behavior. The facts 
that the two victims in this case are juvenile females and that Johnson is a 
family member are precisely what make these incidents unfortunately 
quite ordinary. The prior acts are irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. 
Id. at *4. In Johnson, the court noted that its holding was in conflict with prior decisions. 
Id. at *4 n.5. The court specifically cited State v. Label/e, 126 Idaho 564,887 P.2d 1071 
(1995), which "relied heavily on Moore." Id. Phillips is just as incompatible with 
Johnson, and also relies heavily on Moore. In this case, just as in Johnson, the 
allegation is that Mr. Gomez, a family member, abused juvenile females. Pursuant to 
Johnson, such acts are "unfortunately quite ordinary," irrelevant, and inadmissible. 
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A standard of a "general plan" to abuse an "identifiable group" is a standard that 
allows propensity evidence because it is no different than stating that if the defendant 
committed the act before, he probably did it this time as well. And in a post-Grist world, 
"this complete reliance upon propensity is not a permissible basis for the admission of 
evidence of uncharged misconduct." Id. After Grist, the evidence needs to be more 
than simply "similar age and similar circumstances." In order to show a common 
scheme or a plan to commit multiple offenses, the State must demonstrate such a plan 
"embrac[es] the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of 
one tends to establish the other .... " Grist, 147 Idaho at ,205 P.3d at 1190-91 
(citations omitted). 
To the extent that the law relied upon by the district court was well-settled prior to 
Grist, it is no longer the law. The State must demonstrate a plan in which the crimes 
are so related to each other than one tends to prove the other, not a "general plan." 
Pursuant to Grist and Johnson, the evidence in this case, that a family member 
allegedly abused juvenile females, is irrelevant and inadmissible. Further, in Johnson, 
the State asserted that the evidence corroborated the victim and was therefore 
admissible. Johnson, at *3. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected the argument. The 
same result is demanded here. 
3. Prejudice 
Finally, even if relevant, the evidence should have been excluded under I.R.E. 
403. Under I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence can be excluded by the district court if, inter 
alia, the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, danger of misleading the jury, or if the 
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evidence would involve needless presentation of cumulative evidence. State v. Tapia, 
127 Idaho 249, 254, 899 P.2d 959, 964 (1995). This Court reviews the issue of whether 
the probative value of prior bad acts evidence is substantially outweighed by the 
prejudice of such evidence for an abuse of the district court's discretion. See, e.g., 
State v. Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 72, 44 P.3d 1122, 1127 (2002). 
While the district court's calculus of whether the probative value of evidence is 
substantially outweighed by its prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, this 
discretion is not without limits. As noted by the court in Stoddard: 
This is not a discretion to depart from the principle that evidence of other 
crimes, having no substantial relevancy except to ground the inference 
that [the] accused is a bad man and hence probably committed the crime, 
must be excluded. The leeway of discretion lies rather in the opposite 
direction, empowering the judge to exclude other-crimes evidence, even 
when it has substantial independent relevancy, if in his judgment its 
probative value for this purpose is outweighed by the danger that it will stir 
such passion in the jury as to sweep them beyond a rational consideration 
of guilt or innocence of the crime on trial. Discretion implies not only 
leeway but responsibility. A decision clearly wrong on this question of 
balancing probative value against danger of prejudice will be corrected on 
appeal as an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Stoddard, 105 Idaho 533, 537, 670 P.2d 1318, 1322 (Ct. App. 1983) (quoting 
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW ON EVIDENCE § 190 (Cleary ed. 1972). 
Additionally, as with all matters of discretion on the part of the district court, the 
court's determination of whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by 
its potential prejudice must comport with applicable legal standards. See, e.g., 
Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 70, 175 P.3d 754, 759 (2007) (finding an abuse of 
discretion when the district court's action was not consistent with applicable legal 
standards). 
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Prior sexual misconduct evidence is indeed highly prejudicial. As Justice Bistline 
wrote in Moore: 
Balancing the prejudice against the probative value is especially vital in 
sex abuse cases where the possibility for unfair prejudice is at its 
highest. 
Once the accused has been characterized as a person of abnormal bent, 
driven by biological inclination, it seems relatively easy to arrive at the 
conclusion that he must be guilty, he could not help but be otherwise. 
Moore, 120 Idaho at 748, 819 P.2d at 1148 (Bistline, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Slough and Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IOWA L. REV. 325, 333-34 
(1956». In this case, even assuming that the evidence is relevant, it was highly 
prejudicial and it was extremely cumUlative. Mr. Gomez was charged with one crime 
only - yet the jury heard evidence from six witnesses regarding alleged abuse. This 
trial was more about uncharged acts than was about the charged act. The jury was 
overwhelmed with evidence of uncharged conduct; undoubtedly, it considered 
Mr. Gomez to be a man of bad character. In a case where the danger of unfair 
prejudice is very high, and the jury heard witness after witness describe uncharged 
conduct, the district court abused its discretion by failing to exclude the evidence 
pursuant to I.R.E. 403. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Gomez requests that his judgment of conviction be vacated and his case 
remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 12th day of February, 2010. .~ 
JUSTIN M. U IS 
Deputy Sta e App lIate Public Defender 
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